Rwandan statistics lifted from 10th to 2nd-best in sub-Saharan Africa

by Hamish Wilson/

In 2011, the World Bank had ranked Rwanda’s statistical capacity as 10th in sub-Saharan Africa. By 2012, the country had jumped to being second only to Mauritius. The intervening year saw Wasafiri embedded within the National Institute of Statistics to manage a change programme that would transform Rwanda’s capacity to manage statistics.

Monitoring a country’s development progress requires a variety of socio-economic data. Until 2005, this was collected in Rwanda by several institutions under different government ministries. The National Institute of Statistics (NISR) was then created to establish a more integrated approach, with a UNDP-managed basket fund set up to support its implementation.

However, NISR performance fell short of stakeholder expectations due to a number of shortcomings, including poor budget execution, no release calendar for producing quality data, inadequate coordination of statistical activities, and limited dissemination of statistics.

In 2010, the Institute launched its National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS), complete with a now NISR-managed basket fund for implementing the 5-year plan. This posed a question of how a young institution with limited management capacity and only 50% of staff in post, could effectively raise and manage around US$80 million where the better-resourced UNDP had not succeeded?
Rwanda-National-Agriculture-Survey

One of Wasafiri’s Principal Consultant’s, Liberal Seburikoko, was embedded in to NISR and led the transformative change required to ensure the plan’s successful implementation.

Our starting point was to hold one-to-one consultations with all key internal and external stakeholders to assess the prevailing situation, whilst identifying opportunities for forging authentic partnerships. We then embarked on a clear systemic change agenda, focusing from the outset on empowering identified champions of change to drive the process.

Throughout our engagement, we focused on shaping new behaviours at all levels (e.g. more disciplined budgeting and planning, and improved accountability and delegation), with flexibility and adaptability also encouraged within the NISR and among donors. Finally, we developed management tools and frameworks to transition from capacity enhancement to an enduring legacy of actionable mechanisms.

The outcome has been extremely rewarding, with the NISR now perceived as an institutional role model both locally and abroad, drawing positive assessments from auditors and stakeholders alike, and securing additional resources from newly-interested non-traditional sources. The NISR is now on course to breaking yet another record, by releasing its 2012 Census results six months ahead of schedule.

Southern Africa’s North-South Corridor ~ a model for regional integration

by Hamish Wilson/

Wasafiri Consultant, Ellen Hagerman, produced a report on the on-going challenges to the development and implementation of regional infrastructure projects in Southern Africa with a specific focus on the North-South Corridor. The report incorporates both information and analysis based on consultations with approximately 50 stakeholders working on or associated with regional infrastructure development in Southern Africa as well as with individuals and organizations that can provide further analysis and perspective to the context under which infrastructure is currently being developed in the region and on the continent.

The report also aims to incorporate relevant findings and recommendations stemming from a review of recent literature and initiatives that seek to identify and propose recommendations of ways to address the challenges and barriers to infrastructure development. The report is available here: DBSA Report on Challenges to Regional Infrastructure Development Final Report May2012

What enhances innovation? Lessons from my work in Abu Dhabi

by Martin Kalungu-Banda/

Introduction

Youth unemployment is a challenge in many parts of the world. The phenomenon of growing armies of unemployed young people is an alarming reality for governments and all people concerned with the well-being of society. I was in Abu Dhabi from 21st to 27th May 2012 working under the auspices of Common Purpose’s Itijah Venture (which means direction in Arabic). Itijah Venture brought together 40 emerging leaders from seven Arab and three European countries to grapple with the challenge of how to multiply, through information and communication technology (ICT) and social media, youth enterprises as a way of reducing unemployment among young people. Common Purpose invited me to co-design and co-facilitate the Itijah Venture. In this article, I share the key learnings I picked with regard to facilitating an innovation process.

The Results of Itijah

At the end of the week, Itijah Venture participants produced six prototyping ideas that they felt could significantly contribute to the reduction of youth unemployment in Europe and the Middle East. The six ideas were designed to leverage young people’s attraction to and use of ICT and social media. In the next few months following the Abu Dhabi meeting, participants will continue thinking together and developing the ideas into practical and living prototypes as a way of learning how to create large numbers of youth led/managed enterprise and jobs.

Process

The Itijah Venture process began a few months prior to the meeting in Abu Dhabi. The first step was taken when the Itijah Venture Advisory Board set the challenge as stated above. In many instances, training programmes simply take people away from their normal life activities and, for a few days, make them learn about tools, techniques and practices of leadership. This is not enough for imparting practical skills. Common Purpose, over the years, has learnt that the best way to run leadership development programmes is by locating the training within a particular challenge that is crucial to the client organisation or a group of people. In this way, the return on investment in training has greater chances of being realised and measured than when training and problem solving are done separately.  

The second step was the identification of emerging leaders to participate in the programme and sending them to gather data about the challenge. As soon as the candidates were selected, they were asked to go to “places of most potential for learning about the challenge”. Candidates went out to interview individuals or groups and observing situations where they could quickly learn about the challenge: what it is, how it manifests itself, what attempts have been done to resolve it; lessons picked from these attempts; and what stakeholders in the challenge fee can be done to resolve it. This is also known as sensing journey or learning through the eyes of stakeholders.

Upon arrival in Abu Dhabi, participants were introduced to and made a committed to certain ways of working that maximised collaboration and collective thinking. After the effective working atmosphere was established, participants went through a process of sharing the lessons they had picked during their sensing journeys. During the following two days, participants continued their sensing journeys by listening to subject matter specialists, entrepreneurs, and visiting places where they could learn through observation. Towards the end of the third day, participants started making sense of the information or data they had picked since they were accepted on the programme. On the final day, participants working creatively in small groups built sculptures that represented the ideas for prototyping. Participants played consultants to one another by challenging each other’s ideas, testing whether the ideas game changing.

Key Lessons

The following are the key lessons I picked from Itijah innovation process:

  1. Working in the moment: on the second day, one of the participants asked, “how come we are talking about youth unemployment and we do not have young people who are facing or will soon be facing unemployment?” My co-facilitator, Karen, and I knew instantly that we needed to find young people. Fortunately, one of the participants was from within Abu Dhabi. After a few phone calls we had three amazing young people who joined us. Their perspectives and ideas transformed the way we were looking at the challenge. One female youth said to the group, “Stop thinking like adults. See the world through our eyes, then you will stumble on ideas that may be helpful to us.” I learnt that when you are innovating, you need to work in the moment – make decisions as the situation unfolds. Innovation does not work when you are bent on ‘implementing’ the programme as you designed it.
  2. Value of Diversity and multi-stakeholders: Although the group of participants was reasonably diverse in terms of regions, gender, cultures, and age (to some extent), we did not pay attention to the importance of involving the most important key stakeholders – the unemployed youth themselves. I learnt that you need multi-stakeholder representatives to create conditions for coming up with new ideas that have a chance of working.
  3. Sensing and new knowledge: In their feedback at the end of the process, a number of participants admitted that they did not believe they could come up with ‘clever’ ideas on a subject matter they had no expertise in. They were pleasantly surprised that in the end they came up with ideas that ‘outside experts’ who came to listen to sculpted concepts thought could significantly contribute to enterprise development and job creation. I learnt that when you genuinely open your mind and go out and listen to and observe (sensing) the practical experts, every group can come up with innovative ideas.
  4. Staying with the problem long enough: from the first day in Abu Dhabi, a number of participants wanted to dive into brainstorming the possible solutions. My co-facilitator and I kept on encouraging them to focus on trying to understand or experience the challenge. This needed managing because some of the participants proudly described themselves as “action oriented”. They were worried that we would leave Abu Dhabi without coming up with any meaningful solutions. We invited them to stay with the challenge a little longer. At the end of the week, the “action oriented participants” were surprised at how easy creative ideas came towards the end of the process. I learnt that creative solutions tend to come with ease when you stay with the problem long enough. Jumping to solutions does not help.

Conclusion

Collective intelligence is possible and repeatable when a good (proven) process is followed, a diverse group is convened and key stakeholders are involved. 

 

Ownership ~ it starts with a conscious decision to pay the price!

by Hamish Wilson/

The way in which aid is delivered is critical to its impact on reducing poverty and increasing poor people’s access to services. Aid is more effective when the development of policies, plans and their implementation, and budgets are led by the partner country not the donor. This strengthens ownership, the first principle of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Ownership requires concerted effort by all donors and the partner country or institution to transfer power and enhance accountability. It involves both ‘camps’ letting go the old ways of working.

Over the last 11 months or so, I have witnessed an impressive transformation process for the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) as it implements its first ever 5-year National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS). It is incredible what NISR have so far achieved with only around half of the staffing complement. In the past NISR struggled to follow the pace of its development partners in terms of planning and executing the agreed plans and budget. In a twist of circumstances, the development partners seem to be struggling to follow NISR’s pace. Besides the tremendous support from donors and the government, it took committed leadership that ‘sees’ where NISR needs to be and a resolve to ‘pay the price’ to get there.

The price tag: stronger accountability and letting go

NISR had an earlier strategic plan (2007-2010) that was implemented through pooled funding by DFID, EU and UNDP. The Basket Fund was managed by UNDP on behalf of other donors. There were lots of issues with absorption capacity of funds and effective implementation of projects and activities. The key problem in my view was a kind of laisser-faire approach to management that failed to effectively challenge poor performance and ineffective behaviour, and an inability to adequately manage talent. The turnover was high and some of the most experienced staff tended to be ‘poached’. NISR restructured and increased its staffing complements from 50 to 100. The new management took the bull by the horns. Status quo was no longer an option: accountability was strengthened despite some internal resistance.

Ownership came with a price tag for some donors too: letting go of their ‘power’ to drive their agenda. When the NSDS was approved, a new Basket Fund was set up to support its implementation. A critical decision was made: NISR (not UNDP) would manage the Basket Fund. It so happened that UNDP would not put its resources into the new Basket Fund. The reason – their policy for pooling funds is that UNDP or another UN agency has to manage the pooled funding. The World Bank (WB) indicated formally that it would be joining in early 2010, but as yet the basket fund has not received any financial support from them. In my view, their struggle was that the WB’s decision-making seemed to be centralised in Washington and NISR lacked an interlocutor on the ground with delegated authority to move the process forward.

At times, NISR’s momentum was frustrated by the slow response from donors. The NSDS was underfunded and NISR spent a lot of time negotiating with some donors on what had been already agreed instead of delivering. Eventually, the WB decided to ‘decentralise’ the Task Team Leader position for our programme from a Washington-based staff to a Rwanda-based one. Things seem to be moving faster now and NISR may see the colour of WB money before the end of this year.

I concluded that letting go of ‘old’ habits and ways of doing things was the greatest impediment to effective ownership.

Biting the bullet to make it happen: some success stories

With the money from the WB not coming, and the need to procure vehicles that were needed for the preparatory activities for the Population and Housing Census, a mega operation that covers all households in the country and occurs every 10 years, NISR devised a plan B. The EU agreed that NISR could use its resources to buy these vehicles. This was important as some US$ 1 million was tied with our executing fully the previous allocation. And these vehicles had to be delivered by 31 December 2010 to meet the EU requirements. It was practically impossible to go through the normal open tendering process and get the vehicles by that deadline. Failing to absorb these resources would affect future disbursements next year and NISR had huge funding gaps. NISR decided to go unconventional – make a case for a waiver to single source, got approval from the relevant authorities, and negotiated hard with the supplier. On 30 December 2010, all the 20 vehicles were parked in NISR compound and the cheque paid. NISR is still dealing with challenges from disgruntled vehicle dealers (rightly so) but I am still convinced that it was the right decision for the public interest.

Another success story relates to the fourth Demographic and Health Survey (DHS4). UNICEF was funding the lion’s share of the DHS4 project. In my meeting with UNICEF shortly after I joined NISR, I was informed that NISR was not properly accounting for advances received and this would lead to freezing further disbursements if not addressed by November 2010. NISR had not even drawn 20% of the budget at that time. This would bring to a halt the survey – and both UNICEF and NISR would be seriously in trouble. I could identify very well with the situation UNICEF was in as I used to manage project resources when I was working with DFID. It was frustrating to have to ‘lose’ funds that were meant to improve the lives of the poorest of my fellow citizens just because some official did not do what he or she was paid to do.

Two months later, the inevitable almost happened. I received an urgent email from UNICEF informing me that the funds would be frozen the following day. NISR needed to have accounted for all the advances and request the remaining balance. I had been led to believe that this had been already sorted. A crisis meeting was convened at NISR and UNICEF was invited. We eventually reached a compromise that somehow ‘humiliated’ the acting Director General. I explained to her the cruel dilemma: she accepts the terrible responsibility or the DHS4 stops. She bit the bullet and personally committed in writing to clearing all outstanding balances and holding monthly meetings between UNICEF and NISR. In exchange, UNICEF disbursed the final tranche even before we had fully cleared the previous advances. This required great flexibility from UNICEF and acknowledgement of our responsibility in the failure to comply. Just a few months afterwards, NISR was reporting a zero balance to UNICEF, and in June 2011, we released the preliminary results for the DHS4 that showed fantastic progress against health indicators over the last 5 years or so. On reflection, although the ‘ownership’ price was very high for both UNICEF and NISR, it was a price worth paying.

 

Government leadership makes inspiring contribution to agriculture in Sierra Leone

by Ian Randall/

Sierra Leone is a pioneer of the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), Africa’s plan to boost agricultural production and thereby tackle poverty and hunger. Of the 20+ countries that are active with CAADP, Sierra Leone is further advanced with implementation than all but 1 or 2 others.

I have spent the last 3 days in Freetown running a workshop to strengthen the coalition of support for national CAADP plans. I am struck by the remarkable progress being made. Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world, and only a decade ago emerged from civil war. In such a context, how is Sierra Leone advancing so much faster than other African countries? The quality of leadership from the Minister, President and senior civil servants is the striking difference.

Remarkable progress

In mid-2010, through the CAADP process, the Government of Sierra Leone finalised a 5 year Investment Plan focussed on helping smallholders shift from subsistence farming to commercially viable agriculture. Since then, they have attracted financial commitments for over two thirds of the $403 million plan from a wide variety of sources. 120 of 150 planned Agri-Business Centres have been established as commercial hubs for local networks of farmers. The farmers have organised themselves under a national umbrella organisation. A Chamber of Agriculture is engaging the private sector and negotiating lower interest rates for loans to farmers. INGOs are lining up to train farmers in the management skills they need to run their local Agri Business Centres. Strong and inclusive structures are in place for decision-making centrally and at a district-level. Radio and TV broadcasts are daily channelling informative and educational messages to remote rural communities.

Song used to sensitise rural farmers in Sierra Leone on CAADP

Obviously there are also many problems and set backs. Nonetheless, the progress being made in such a poor and challenging country is truly remarkable, and begs the question – what is special about the CAADP process in Sierra Leone?

Genuine personal leadership from Government

The quality of leadership from senior government officials is striking. It starts at the very top. The President has championed CAADP, prioritised agriculture above all other sectors for its potential to drive pro-poor growth, and chairs a quarterly meeting to ensure progress is made. He holds his Minister’s accountable through performance contracts.

The Minister of Agriculture, Joseph Sam Sesay, is focussed, disciplined and directly engaged in day-to-day implementation. Today he arrived at our workshop on time, ahead of several other participants, and gave a clear, honest speech that compelled others to engage positively. He personally responded to my emails to express support for the workshop during preparations.

Prince Kamara, the senior civil servant in charge of the CAADP process, is equally impressive. He is open, friendly, shares his struggles, seeks help from others, listens, engages in spirited debate, establishes clear goals, and provides structures through which other stakeholders can engage.

All these three emphasise with confidence that Sierra Leoneans are leading the country, and, despite their dependency on donors for 80% of government finance, they demand that the international community aligns behind the country’s priorities rather than imposing their own agendas.

They are also driven by a commitment to serve the interests of Sierra Leonean citizens, especially the poor. As testimony to this, with 70% of Sierra Leoneans working in agriculture as smallholders, the government has prioritised helping these farmers establish themselves as viable businesses.

Leadership as a principle for aid effectiveness

Rwanda is the only country that is clearly further ahead with CAADP than Sierra Leone. Again it is a very poor, post-conflict country that is notable for strong disciplined leadership at senior levels within government.

Perhaps the quality of leadership should be added as another key principle for aid effectiveness. Quality leadership is not entirely a historical accident. Sierra Leone and Rwanda have common factors that could be understood better:

  • A historical commitment to education
  • A returning diaspora bringing regional and international experience
  • A unity forged from overcoming conflict

I am also aware that Presidents in both countries are receiving mentoring from Tony Blair and embedded technical support through his African Governance Initiative.

Donors could gather evidence on what strengthens senior leadership in African governments, and launch initiatives in response. This appears a critical underpinning factor for effective and sustainable development. It would be money well spent. Private sector investors look for companies with strong CEOs, and development finance should similarly realise the importance of effective leadership at the heart of a country.

Despite a sweaty and exhausting few days in the chaos of Freetown, as I sit here waiting for my plane, I do not want to leave. The momentum and sense of excitement about the CAADP process here is infectious. I want to join the coalition coalesced by the government’s genuine leadership. I leave believing that the CAADP process will transform the lives of poor smallholders in Sierra Leone, and it has been a privilege to be part of it.

Building leadership for Transition – the challenge of Afghanistan

by Hamish Wilson/

The following article is reproduced from People in Aid’s Emergency Capacity Building Project “Case Study of Good Practice”

1. Introduction

The continuing conflict in Afghanistan is described as the British Government’s most important foreign priority. Ten years since war first broke out, and with 2014 looming as the anticipated date for transition to full Afghan control, the challenges faced by policy makers, diplomats and advisers on the ground have never been greater.

In early 2010, Hamish Wilson, Consultant and Director of Wasafiri Consulting, was engaged by the UK’s Stabilisation Unit – a specialised agency jointly owned by the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Department for International Development – and deployed to Helmand’s remote northern districts as a Stabilisation Adviser, working on behalf of the Provincial Reconstruction Team.

The war-torn districts of Musa Qala and Now Zad had become infamous as ‘the heart of darkness’ throughout the years of drug lord and Taliban rule. The Afghan Government and NATO wrested back control and with the support of advisers such as Hamish, are helping restore normality for the local population

Embedded with US Marines, and responsible for managing a team of international and Afghan civilians (known as a District Stabilisation Team or DST), Hamish was specifically tasked with coordinating efforts to establish a functional district government and to oversee all reconstruction and development activities.

2. Experiences and reality on the ground

“We as civilians play an unlikely intermediary role – we sit firmly between the US Military and the Afghan political and community leadership. This is the space in which we operate to find ways to generate concerted action to drive the recovery efforts forward coherently.” says Hamish.

He goes on to describe the context in more detail; “Insecurity is high, our movements are limited, people shift their allegiances without warning, and the events of the moment can be utterly unpredictable. Out here the consequences for poor judgement can be extremely high…

Hamish describes an average day in the Musa Qala ‘Forward Operating Base’, painting a vivid (and exhausting) picture of weighty issues and relentless demands for attention: dealing with the aftermath of an attack on the local market, working with the Governor to improve taxation, meeting with the Director of Education to re-open a school closed by fighting, drafting the Governance and Rule of Law aspects of the campaign plan, hosting a team of journalists from Kabul and planning for the coming Community Council elections.

His tales evoke a sense of the leadership dilemmas that must be confronted daily; Where do you draw the line with corruption? How do we best allocate our limited funds? How do we support Afghans to take the lead? How do we manage the incessant competing demands? How do we re-establish a ‘humanitarian space’? How do we address human rights abuses? The list clearly goes on…

Hamish describes some of the keys to success: “Successful leadership in this context is one founded on how well you manage an extraordinarily complex set of relationships between a wildly colourful range of people and institutions – many with competing pressures and interests… If I am respected by the US Marine commander, if I am trusted by the District Governor, if I am valued by the village elders, listened to by the Police Chief, or the farmer who sympathises with the Taliban… then we have a chance of moving forward together. Its fragile and painstaking…”

3. Lessons for the future

As the Afghan and international communities cast their gaze toward the threshold year of 2014, they must begin to lay the foundations for what will emerge as effective leadership in a post-transition world.

Two crucial issues will threaten the prospects of stability over that time if they are overlooked – the strength of Afghan institutions such as it’s security forces and government administration, and the effectiveness of their leaders. In effect, the ‘battle for transition’ will be determined by the efforts of international advisers such as Hamish to build the capacity of local leadership in hostile regions such as Musa Qala. Hamish summarises his efforts thus far;

“This isn’t Iraq. We are working in areas without basic infrastructure, or established education systems, suffering poor access and communication links, and where the concept of government is foreign.” His work with local leaders is focussed on:

  • Helping them create effective means of public engagement and participation
  • Supporting their efforts to resolve complex and competing issues
  • Developing basic systems of accountability and management of public finances
  • Helping them to better manage their own teams and people
  • Coaching them on navigating Afghan and international institutions

But the race is on. In just a few short years, it will be the Afghans taking the lead for themselves, with or without such support.

4. Conclusion

Hamish makes it clear that there are simply not enough resources to adequately accelerate the daunting task of developing local leadership in time for the deadline of transition. “There are only six in my team, yet we are working with the Police, Prosecutor, Governor’s team, Line Ministry officials, local leaders, Council members… there is a real risk that it is too little too late…”

And he is right – the sacrifices of the past decade, and the intensive efforts of the next few years will only create the conditions for a durable political settlement, for a lasting peace, if Afghan leadership succeeds. That then, must become the rallying cry for the international community.